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Abstract:
We hypothesize that the payout method chosen to distribute a cash flow shock is primarily determined by
the permanence of the shock. Dividend increases will be observed following cash flow shocks with a
relatively large permanent component while repurchases will be used to distribute shocks that are primarily
transient. Further, this implies that the market will use the announcement of the payout method to update its
beliefs about the permanence of past and contemporary cash flow shocks. Using a large sample of dividend
increases and repurchases, we find support for these hypotheses. The post-shock cash flows of dividend
increasing firms do not fully revert back to pre-shock levels. Those of repurchasing firms completely
revert to pre-shock levels, even settling below them. The stock price reactions to the announcements of
both repurchases and dividend increases show strong evidence that the information in a payout
announcement is not only the size of the payout, but also the method used to distribute the cash. The
announcement of a payout method that does not match the market’s expectations causes the market to
update its previous assessment of the permanence of the cash flow shock.
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transient. Further, this implies that the market will use the announcement of the payout method to update its
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THE CASH FLOW PERMANENCE AND INFORMATION CONTENT
OF DIVIDEND INCREASES VS. REPURCHASES
1. INTRODUCTION
Dividends and share repurchases are the two primary methods used by
corporations to distribute cash to shareholders.

While each method has received

considerable attention in the academic literature, relatively few studies examine the
choice between repurchases and dividends. We hypothesize that firms choose between
repurchases and dividends to distribute cash flow shocks based on the permanence of the
shocks. We argue that because dividend increases are implicitly permanent, repurchases
are used to disburse transient cash flow shocks while dividend changes are used when the
shock is relatively more permanent. Further, if management’s choice of payout method
is driven by its expectations about cash flow permanence, this hypothesis also has
implications for the information conveyed by a dividend change or repurchase
announcement. To the extent that stock prices do not fully anticipate a firm’s method of
payout, the market is expected to use the firm’s choice of payout method to update its
estimate of cash flow permanence. Thus, we focus on the information conveyed by the
method used to make the distribution, as opposed to the information contained in the
amount or occurrence of the distribution.
We find that the size of the cash flow shock experienced by repurchasing and
dividend-increasing firms is similar. However, shocks followed by substantial dividend
increases are significantly more permanent than those followed by repurchases.
Compared to a control sample of non-distributing firms, dividend-increasing firms have
significantly higher permanence, while the permanence of repurchasing firms’ shocks is
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indistinguishable from that of non-distributing firms. Further, we find that the market
anticipates the permanence of the cash flow shock, on average. The stock price reaction
to cash flows preceding dividend increases is significantly higher than the reaction to
cash flows preceding repurchases.
Although, on average, the stock market correctly separates transient and
permanent cash flow shocks, it is wrong on occasion. When the market identifies a cash
flow shock as transient and management chooses to increase dividends, the market
should positively update its belief about the permanence of the shock. Similarly, when a
repurchase is used to distribute a shock that the market believed to be relatively
permanent, the stock price reaction to the announcement should include a negative
reassessment of the permanence of that shock. We find that stock price reactions to
dividend changes and repurchases are consistent with both of these conjectures. We
conclude that part of the information in a payout announcement is the method of
distribution, and that the market uses this information to update its assessment of the
permanence of contemporaneous cash flow shocks. Thus, our evidence contributes to the
understanding of the factors driving the choice between alternative payout methods, as
well as the nature of the information content of the payout announcements.
In the next section, we review the relevant literature and develop our hypothesis.
Section 3 describes the data and sample selection. The empirical tests are carried out in
section 4 and conclusions are presented in section 5.
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2. LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT
Literature Review
This study compares the two primary payout alternatives: dividend increases and
repurchases. While there are very few empirical studies that examine both methods
simultaneously, there are extensive literatures studying each method in isolation. Since
Lintner’s (1956) seminal paper on dividends and earnings, there has been a steady
academic quest to identify the information content of dividends for earnings. An early
study by Watts (1973) examines dividend announcements and finds that the information
content in dividends about future earnings is trivial. Subsequent studies have used larger
samples and different techniques, and have produced mixed results. Dividend changes do
seem to cause analysts to change their earnings forecasts (Ofer and Siegel, 1987, Denis,
Denis and Sarin, 1994, Carroll, 1995). However, there is little consistent evidence that
dividends have incremental information relative to contemporaneous earnings in
predicting future earnings (Leftwich and Zmijewski, 1994, DeAngelo, DeAngelo and
Skinner, 1996, Benartzi, et al., 1997). Benartzi, et al. (1997) study a comprehensive
sample of dividend changes and conclude that if dividend increases signal anything about
future earnings, it is that earnings are less likely to fall than for similar firms without
dividend increases.

They conclude that dividends are a reaction to past and

contemporaneous earnings changes rather than a signal of higher future earnings.
Kormendi and Zarowin (1996) also examine the relation between dividends and
permanent earnings changes. They conclude that while permanent changes in earnings
are a factor that affects dividends, there are other factors as well, such as taxes and
transaction costs.
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The evidence on repurchases as signals of future earnings is also mixed. Dann
(1981) provides evidence that the stock price reaction to self-tender offers is due to
positive information conveyed by the repurchase. Dann, Masulis and Mayers (1991)
show that analyst forecast changes and earnings surprises follow repurchase tender offer
announcements, and that these surprises are related to the stock price reaction to
repurchases. Bartov (1991) finds what he terms “weak” evidence that positive earnings
surprises occur in the same year as an open-market repurchase.

Finally, Lie and

McConnell (1998) find little evidence that repurchase tender offers are followed by
improved earnings. Their only evidence of superior performance is that the sample firms
exhibit less mean reversion in return on assets than other firms in the same industry.
Overall, the recent empirical evidence questions the roles of dividends and
repurchases as signals of higher future cash flows. The evidence in Benartzi, et al. (1997)
implies that changes in regular quarterly dividends can be best explained as a reaction to
past and contemporaneous earnings shocks rather than as signals of improved future
earnings. Similarly, the study of repurchase tender offers by Lie and McConnell (1998)
shows that there is little evidence that repurchases precede higher future performance.
Rather, they show that the return on assets observed prior to the repurchase is less likely
to fall in the future. One implication of these findings, tested here, is that different
payout choices signal varying degrees of permanence of contemporaneous performance
shocks, rather than higher future performance.
Few studies have jointly examined dividends and repurchases. One of the earlier
studies, Bagwell and Shoven (1988), provides descriptive evidence regarding the
increased distribution of cash through repurchases and acquisitions as alternatives to
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dividends.

They conclude that tax arguments are unlikely to explain the use of

repurchases and suggest a contagion/learning model instead. Most research that has
examined the two payout methods together has focused primarily on their relative
efficacy as signals of future performance.

For example, Ofer and Thakor (1987)

demonstrate theoretically that repurchase tender offers should be used to correct large
misvaluations while dividends are more efficient for smaller misvaluations. Choi and
Chen (1997) test the predictions of Ofer and Thakor (1987) on a sample of dividend
changes and tender offer share repurchases. In support of Ofer and Thakor, they find the
stock price reaction is larger for a repurchase tender offer announcement, even after
controlling for the size of the distribution.
A recent paper by Bartov, Krinsky and Lee (1998) examines a sample of 260
firms, half of whom repurchase shares and half of whom pay dividends.

They

hypothesize that the managers will choose a repurchase over a dividend if: management
views its shares as greatly undervalued, management has options that are not
dividend-protected, or a large fraction of equity ownership is held by institutions, which
seem to show a preference for repurchases. Their evidence generally supports their
predictions. While we agree that all of these factors are important on the margin in
making the distribution decision, we view our paper as complementary in that we focus
on a fundamental determinant of the decision—the stability of the underlying cash flows.
Hypothesis Development
We hypothesize that both dividend increases and repurchases are used to
distribute past and contemporaneous cash flow shocks. This view is broadly consistent
with the evidence in Bartov (1991) and Benartzi, et al. (1997). We argue that the choice
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between these two payout methods depends upon the expected permanence of the
realized cash flow shock. Lintner (1956), Fama and Babiak (1968), and Asquith and
Mullins (1983), among others, provide evidence that dividend increases are intended to
be and are, on average, permanent. Repurchases, by comparison, are generally standalone actions that must be taken each time shares are acquired (though they may be part
of a pattern of planned repurchases).1

Therefore, because a dividend increase is

implicitly more permanent, we hypothesize that dividend increases follow cash flow
shocks that are more permanent than those followed by repurchases.
This expected relation between payout method and the permanence of future cash
flows has implications for the information content of dividend increases relative to
repurchases, assuming the market does not perfectly anticipate these actions. Since
dividend changes are relatively more permanent, an increase in the dividend provides the
market with favorable information about the extent to which past and contemporaneous
cash flows are likely to continue. On the other hand, when a repurchase is used instead
of a dividend change, the market is expected to adjust downward its estimate of the
permanence of cash flow shocks, on average.2 The magnitude of this price reaction will
depend upon the extent to which a payout announcement causes the market to change its
expectations about the permanence of a firm’s cash flows. As such, it is important to
consider the information content of the payout choice conditional on the market’s
expectations about cash flow permanence.

1

In a comprehensive study of actual share acquisitions in open market repurchase programs in the 1980s,
Stephens and Weisbach (1998) find that only 10% of the sample firms have more than one repurchase in
any three-year period.
2
This hypothesis is consistent with the evidence presented in Brickley (1983) for specially designated
dividends. Brickley finds that the labeling of a dividend increase as special is a less positive signal than a
regular, unlabelled increase, and that earnings are more likely to increase following the latter.
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A simple model will aid in the exposition of our predictions. Assume that cash
flow shocks can either completely dissipate or be completely permanent.

The firm

receives a cash flow shock at time 1. Its cash flows for time 1 are its normal level of cash
flows plus the shock: CF+Shock. In the future, its cash flows will be CF+p×Shock, where
p is the permanence parameter, taking the value of either 0 or 1. The firm exists for two
periods and makes a distribution announcement between times 1 and 2.
Assuming a discount rate of zero without loss of generality, the price of the firm
in period 1 when the shock is observed will be P1=(CF+Shock)+[CF+Pr(p=1 | g)Shock].
The managers observe the permanence parameter, p, but the market does not. Therefore,
the market must assess the probability that the permanence parameter equals 1 based on
its information at the time of the shock, represented by g. The managers then make a
distribution announcement. If the shock is permanent, they choose a dividend, but if the
shock is temporary, they choose a repurchase.3

The market observes the choice of

distribution method and updates its belief about the permanence of the shock. Thus, the
price after the distribution announcement will be P2 = 2(CF+Shock) if a dividend is
announced, and P2 = (CF+Shock)+CF if a repurchase is announced.
The change in price due to the announcement of the distribution will be
decreasing in Pr(p = 1 | g ). If the managers announce a dividend increase, then Pr(p=1)
goes to 1, and the increase in price is a decreasing function of the probability the market
placed on observing a dividend increase. If the managers announce a repurchase, then
3

While this model is intended only to ease the exposition of the paper, this choice by managers can be
made to be a separating equilibrium by continuing the life of the firm past two periods and making it
prohibitively costly for managers of temporary shock-type firms to continue paying a dividend if they
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Pr(p=1) goes to 0. In this case, the price will fall, unless Pr(p = 1 | g ) = 0, meaning the
market completely anticipated the repurchase. As the market puts more weight on the
possibility that the distribution will be a dividend increase, the price change upon
announcement of a repurchase decreases.

Thus, for both types of distribution

announcements, the announcement return, conditional on the chosen method, will be
decreasing in the prior weight put on p being equal to 1.
To summarize, the two predictions of the permanence hypothesis are: 1) the cash
flow shock preceding a dividend increase will have a larger permanent component than
cash flow shocks preceding a repurchase, and 2) the market will use management’s
choice of payout method to update its belief about the permanent component of the cash
flow shock.

3. DATA
We identify a sample of firms that declare either dividend increases or openmarket repurchase authorizations.

Working from the distribution decision date, we

collect data on cash flows for 8 years centered on the year of the distribution decision,
year t. For each sample firm, we compute baseline cashflows over years t-4 through t-2,
the cash flow shock during years t-1 through t, and future cash flows from years t+1
through t+3. Using these cash flow measures, we compare the permanence of cash flows
between the two types of firms.4

chose one in period 2. Costly external financing and a properly designed compensation package for
managers would achieve the separation.
4
An alternative approach would be to start with a cash flow shock and then track what the firm does. We
feel that the alternative approach would be better suited to addressing a different question—a question of
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We begin with a comprehensive set of open market repurchases from 1981 to
1993.

These data are gathered from the Securities Data Company database of

repurchases. Further, if a firm announces two repurchases within 4 quarters of each
other, we eliminate the second one. These second repurchases could be reauthorizations
of the previously announced program. To this repurchase sample, we add all of the
dividend increases made by firms in the CRSP database over the same time period. We
define a dividend increase to occur when the current year’s total dividend payout is
greater than the previous year’s dividend payout. Annual dividend increases are included
only when each quarterly dividend change within a fiscal year is either positive or zero;
that is, when both negative and positive quarterly changes occur within the same fiscal
period, the observation is excluded. The resulting dataset contains 1153 repurchases and
5010 dividend changes. Table 1 presents the distribution of the events across time.
We further subdivide the dividend sample by identifying dividend increases that
could be characterized as regular or recurring. Some firms try to increase their dividend
by a very small fraction every year, presumably so they can tell their shareholders that
dividends have increased so many years in a row. This can be viewed as a signal of
managerial and firm quality and is similar to the rationale given in the accounting
literature for steadily increasing earnings streams. Another concern is that some of these
dividend increases are actually smaller than the increase in the prior year, and should not
be viewed as the primary payout reaction in the two-year shock window. Therefore, we
segment the dividends into two categories. The first category contains increases that are

why some firms distribute cash flow shocks and others do not. Our approach has two advantages: first, it
does not force the sample firms to have a cash flow shock of some arbitrary magnitude; second, by its
design, it identifies all firms that make a distribution decision. This second point is important because it
allows us to begin with a complete sample of distribution changes.
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not preceded by a dividend in the previous year, or are larger than the dividend increase
in the previous year.

The second includes the remainder, which we will term

small/routine dividend increases. This type of dividend increase is expected to carry
significantly less information about cash flows than a more substantial increase. There
are 2962 observations in the first category and 2048 in the second.

4. EMPIRICAL RESULTS
We begin by testing the hypothesis that the distribution method is related to the
permanence of previous and contemporaneous cash flows. Establishing that, we move on
to examine whether the market’s expectations about permanence are consistent with our
findings, on average. We do this by measuring the stock return associated with the cash
flows, in a manner similar to the measurement of earnings response coefficients. Finally,
we examine the announcement returns for both repurchases and dividend increases to test
the prediction that the market uses information in the payout method to update its
expectations about cash flow permanence.

These final tests indicate that the

announcement return contains an adjustment component reflecting the new information
relayed by the payout method about the permanence of the cash flow shock.
Summary Statistics
Table 2 presents summary statistics for the samples of repurchasers and dividend
increasers. While the repurchasers and substantial dividend increasers are similar in size,
the small/routine dividend increasers are somewhat larger. The median market value of
equity for repurchasers and substantial dividend increasers is about $440 million
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compared to $655 million for small/routine dividend increasers.

This difference is

consistent with the notion that, on average, larger, more mature firms use dividends more
regularly. Although the market-to-book ratios differ statistically across the samples, the
mean and median values for the repurchasers are within 5% of the respective mean and
median values for both samples of dividend increasers. The leverage ratios indicate that
dividend increasers tend to be more levered than their repurchasing counterparts.
Finally, the table provides information about the size of the cash distributions.
The median increase in dividends is 13.2% for substantial increasers and 8.6% for
small/routine increasers. However, there appear to be some large outliers, as evidenced
by the substantially larger mean values. The SDC database only contains information on
the number of shares sought for 696 of the repurchasing firms. For those firms, the mean
and median percentages of outstanding shares sought were 8.6% and 6.3%, respectively.
The Size and Permanence of the Cash flow shock
Consistent with previous studies (e.g., Dechow, 1994), cash flow from operations
is computed as:
CFOt = Operating income before depreciationt - Interestt - Taxest - ∆Working capitalt

Cash flow from operations is scaled by beginning-of-period assets to reduce
heteroscedasticity and spurious correlations due to firm size.
Table 3 indicates that the size and permanence of the cash flow shocks
experienced by the sample firms are broadly consistent with our predictions. The timing
and definition of these measures are illustrated in Figure 1. Year 0 is the year in which
the dividend is increased or repurchase is authorized. The cash flow shock is measured
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by comparing the cash flows in years -1 and 0 with the cash flows in years -4, -3 and -2.
The size of the shock is defined as :
Avg Cash Flow in years -1 and 0 - Avg Cash flow in years - 4 to - 2
Avg Cash flow in years - 4 to - 2
The mean size of shocks experienced by repurchasers is 0.320, and is bigger than the
mean size for the substantial dividend-increasing firms, 0.247. However, the distribution
of these shocks is substantially skewed. The median shock for repurchasers is 0.040, and
is significantly smaller than the 0.064 shock for substantial dividend firms. The mean
and median shocks for the small/routine dividend increasers, 0.098 and -0.005, are
considerably smaller than for either of the other two samples. Thus, the two dividend
subsamples appear to make their payout choices in response to substantially different
cash flow patterns.
The table also includes two measures of the permanence of the shock. The first is
defined as:
Avg Cash flow in years +1 to + 3 - Avg Cash flow in years -1 and 0
Avg Cash flow in years -1 and 0
This variable captures the permanent component of the shock by measuring the extent to
which future cash flows remain at the level of the shock. We argue that managers who
react to a cash flow shock by increasing dividends expect some portion of that shock to
be permanent. Further, the proportion of the shock that is permanent for substantial
dividend increasing firms should be greater than the proportion for repurchasing firms.
We call this first measure, the “permanence” of the shock.
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The second measure of the permanence of the shock differs from the first by its
comparison period. It is designed to measure the degree to which future cash flows revert
back to their pre-shock level. We calculate the average size of the cash flows in years +1
through +3 relative to the average size of the cash flows in years -4 to -2. Even if very
little of the actual shock remains into the future, we predict that firms with substantial
dividend increases should expect their cash flows to exhibit less reversion back to prior
levels than repurchasing firms’ cash flows. We call this measure the “stability” of cash
flows and define it as:
Avg Cash flow in years +1 to + 3 - Avg Cash flow in years - 4 to - 2
Avg Cash flow in years - 4 to - 2
The results presented in table 3 are consistent with expectations. As with the cash
flow shocks, we concentrate on the medians because the distributions are skewed. The
permanence measure indicates that shocks followed by substantial dividend changes are
more permanent than those followed by repurchases. The medians of the permanence
measure show that, after the change in payout, cash flows of substantial dividend
increasers drop by about 5% from the shock level, compared to a 7% drop in the cash
flows of repurchasers.5

The greater median permanence for dividend increasers is

statistically significant at the 5% level. The stability measure, which indicates persistence
of cash flows above pre-shock levels, shows that future cash flows of the median

5

It is not surprising that the average permanence of the entire sample is negative. Dechow, Kothari, and
Watts (1998) model the time-series properties of operating cash flows and the accounting process that
incorporates expected future cash flows in earnings. They show that when demand for a firm’s products
varies over time, differences in the timing of cash outlays and inflows leads to negative serial correlation in
cash flow changes. For example, a firm that experiences a positive shock in product demand is likely to
make cash outlays in the current period for inventories and accounts payable, but not fully receive the cash
inflows until some future period when sales are made and accounts receivable are collected. They also
provide empirical support for their predictions by finding a significant negative serial correlation of –0.28
between cash flow changes.
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substantial dividend increaser are significantly larger than the pre-shock level by about
2%.

In contrast, repurchasing firms show a significant reduction in cash flows to

approximately 93% of pre-shock levels.
The stability measure of the small/routine dividend increasers again indicates that
these firms differ from the more substantial increasers. While the permanence of the
shock is the same for these two samples, the stability measures are markedly different. In
contrast to the 2% increase in the future cash flows of substantial dividend increasers
relative to the pre-shock level, small/routine dividend increasers, like the repurchasers,
experience a 7% drop in future cash flows. This difference is statistically significant at
the 5% level. These results highlight the importance of the earlier supposition that not all
dividend increases convey similar information about the stability of the firm’s cash flows.
For robustness, we constrain the repurchase sample to only those firms that also
pay dividends.

One could argue that these firms legitimately had both methods of

distribution available to them: an increase in their dividend or a repurchase. Firms that
did not have an established dividend would have to initiate a dividend as an alternative to
a repurchase—an event that we do not explicitly examine in this study.6 Using this
restricted sample does not change the inferences of Table 3. We will continue to discuss
the robustness of our results to using the restricted sample throughout the remainder of
the analysis and, where appropriate, present tabulated results based on that sample.

6

We have computed the permanence and stability statistics for the 97 dividend initiating firms that meet
our data requirements (which include 4 prior years of cash flows). Firms that choose to initiate a dividend
instead of a repurchase have future cash flows that are extremely permanent, on average, remaining at
106% of pre-shock cash flows.
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Overall, the evidence in this section is consistent with the hypothesis that, relative
to substantial dividend changes, repurchases are used to distribute more transient shocks.
It is possible, however, that these findings are influenced by firm-specific or industryspecific characteristics of the sample firms. To explore this issue further, in table 4 we
report permanence and stability measures for a sample of control firms that did not
increase dividends or initiate repurchases. The initial pool of firms for the control sample
consists of all firms with sufficient data available on CRSP and Compustat to compute
our measures of cash flow shock, permanence, and stability. From this group, we remove
all firm-year observations that overlap with our initial sample of repurchasers and
dividend increasers. We create 20 equal-sized control portfolios based on the size of the
cash flow shock and match each of our repurchase/dividend change sample firms to a
portfolio based on the ranking of their cash flow shocks. To control for industry-specific
differences in permanence and stability, we also restrict each control portfolio to contain
only firms with the same 2-digit SIC code as the sample firm.7 Table 4 shows the mean
and median permanence and stability measures for both the sample firms and the
matching firms. It also presents the mean and median difference between the sample and
matching firms for these measures and tests for the significance of those differences.
For the pooled sample of dividend increasers and repurchasers, the matching
firms have significantly negative median permanence and stability measures. The mean
and median differences between the pooled sample and the matching firms are positive
and statistically significant. Thus, relative to firms that do not increase their payouts,

7

We have repeated the matching using size of cash flow shock and size of firm as the matching criteria.
The results are qualitatively unchanged.
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firms that choose to increase their total payouts experience shocks with larger permanent
components that revert less to the pre-shock cash flow level. For the firms making
substantial dividend increases, the results are even stronger. The matching firms exhibit
substantially less permanence and less stability than the substantial dividend-increasing
firms. In contrast, however, the repurchasers and small/routine dividend increasers have
permanence and stability measures that are insignificantly different from those of the
matching firms. Given the nature of the dividend increases in the small/routine increase
sample, the similarity of their cash flows to matching firms is not surprising. One
possible explanation for the similarity between repurchasers and matching firms, not
tested here, is that the repurchasers and matching firms differ only in their investment
opportunities.

The repurchasers have temporarily low investment opportunities and

choose to make a one-time distribution, while the matching firms experience the same
cash flow shock, but choose to invest the money instead.
These results for open-market repurchases are in contrast to those in Lie and
McConnell (1998) for firms conducting repurchase tender offers. They find that their
sample firms exhibit lower mean reversion in return on assets than matched firms. The
fact that performance shocks prior to repurchase tender offers are more permanent than
those prior to open market repurchases is consistent with the view that the former are
stronger signals.

Repurchase tender offers are immediate commitments and their

completion is observable, whereas open-market programs do not have to be completed.
To summarize, we establish that cash flow shocks experienced by firms that
subsequently make substantial dividend increases are more permanent and stable than
those experienced by firms making repurchases, small/routine dividend increases, and an
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industry-and-cash-flow-shock-matched control sample. In the next section, we investigate
whether the market’s categorization of these shocks as permanent or transitory is
consistent with the observed payout choice and the results in table 3.
The Information Content of the Method of Payout
In this section, we examine the stock price reaction to both the cash flows during
the shock period and the subsequent announcement of the payout method. The evidence
is consistent with the market recognizing the differing degrees of permanence, on
average, and using the announcement of a payout method to update its beliefs about that
permanence. Finally, we discuss the robustness of our results to additional controls.
Market Reaction to Cash flows
Earnings response coefficients measure the association between stock returns and
earnings. Since stock prices anticipate future cash flows, earnings response coefficients
are expected to increase with the permanence of earnings (e.g., Beaver, Lambert, and
Morse, 1980, Kormendi and Lipe, 1987, Collins and Kothari, 1989). Further, Kothari
and Sloan (1992) show that returns anticipate earnings up to 3 years ahead. Since
earnings and cash flows differ only by differences in timing, the intuition for the market’s
response to earnings also holds for cash flows (Dechow, 1994). If dividend increases are
associated with more permanent cash flows in years +1 through +3 than are repurchases,
then forward-looking returns in the pre-announcement period should partially anticipate
this difference. To test this hypothesis, we measure cash flow response coefficients over
the 8 quarters leading up to the payout announcement (the cash flow shock period). We
compare the response coefficients for firms that subsequently increase their dividends to
those for firms that subsequently announce a share repurchase. If the permanence of the
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shock drives the payout method decision and, on average, the market correctly anticipates
the permanence of the shock, then the stock price response to the cash flows should also
be related to the subsequent payout method choice.
To measure the market’s expectation about the permanence of cash flows, we
examine the response coefficient from a contemporaneous regression of stock returns on
cash flows measured over the 8 quarters immediately preceding the payout
announcement. The first regression in table 5 shows that for all observations the average
coefficient on cash flows is 0.58. The sign and magnitude of this coefficient is consistent
with previous studies.

Dechow (1994) finds that for a broad sample of firms, the

coefficient on cash flows in one-year and four-year regressions are 0.33 and 0.68,
respectively.
To investigate whether the cash flows preceding dividend increases are thought to
be more permanent than those preceding repurchases, we create two additional variables
that allow the coefficient on cash flows to vary with the subsequently-announced payout
method.

The first interacts cash flows with a dummy variable equal to one if the

dividend increase is substantial, and zero otherwise. The second interacts cash flows
with a dummy variable equal to one if the dividend increase is small/routine, and zero
otherwise. Thus, in the second specification, the coefficient on 2-year cash flows is
interpreted as the markets’ reaction to cash flows for repurchasers preceding the payout
announcement. The coefficients on the dividend interaction variables are therefore the
market’s marginal reaction to cash flows relative to repurchasers.
On average, the market appears to price cash flows during the shock period in a
manner consistent with the earlier findings on permanence and stability. The coefficient
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on the interaction term for substantial dividend increasers is 0.35 and significantly
positive. The coefficient on the interaction term for small/routine dividend increasers is
positive, 0.10, but not significant. The final column of table 5 re-estimates the same
specification on the restricted sample that excludes repurchasing firms that did not
already have a dividend established. The results are qualitatively unchanged except that
the market now attributes somewhat greater permanence to the cash flows of
small/routine dividend increasers relative to this sample of repurchasers. We also repeat
the analysis with earnings instead of cash flows and the results are qualitatively
unchanged.
In summary, the results in table 5 are consistent with the joint hypothesis that the
decision to use a repurchase or dividend increase is related to the permanence of the cash
flow shock, and that the market on average correctly categorizes the permanence of cash
flows. That is, consistent with the results in tables 3 and 4, the price reactions to the cash
flows of repurchasers and small/routine dividend increasers are positive and roughly the
same magnitude, whereas the reaction to the cash flows of substantial dividend increasers
is significantly greater.
Stock Price Reaction to the Payout Announcement
In this section, we examine the stock price reaction to announcements of dividend
increases and repurchases. The regressions are designed to test whether the market uses
the payout announcement to update its estimate of the permanence of the cash flow
shock. Figure 2 illustrates an information timeline useful in understanding our regression
components.
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We first estimate, for each firm, the market’s expectation about cash flow
permanence going forward into the years following the payout announcement.

We

estimate this expectation using the residuals from the table 5 regressions, where we
measure the average association between stock returns and cash flows during the shock
period preceding the payout announcement.

The residuals from table 5 represent

adjusted returns, where each firm’s return is adjusted by the average return for its level of
cash flows.

We will be measuring the announcement reactions separately for the

different payout methods. Therefore, we use specification 2 from table 5 which produces
return predictions for the average substantial dividend increasing firm, average
small/routine increasing firm and average repurchasing firm. However, our findings are
not sensitive to this choice, and are robust to using either of the other two specifications.
We interpret the adjusted return from table 5 as follows. If the return is higher than
average for a given level of cash flows, (i.e., the residual is positive), we view the market
as expecting the cash flows to be relatively permanent. Similarly, if the return is lower
than average for a given level of cash flows, (i.e., the residual is negative), we view the
market as expecting the cash flow shock to be relatively transient.
We now develop predictions about the relation between the payout
announcement, market expectations about cash flow permanence, and announcement
returns. Although stock returns are expected to, on average, reflect the permanence of
future cash flows, the market is likely to forecast cash flow permanence with error. Since
the choice of payout method is shown above to be associated with cash flow permanence,
we predict that the market will use information in the payout announcement to update its
expectations about permanence. If the adjusted return from the table 5 regressions is
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high, and the firm chooses a repurchase to distribute cash flows, we predict that the
market will react negatively as it adjusts downward its expectation of cash flow
permanence.

In terms of the model from section 2, this is a case where market

participants assigned too high a probability to the greater permanence, that is, Pr(p = 1 |
g) is too high. Similarly, if the return residual is low, and the firm chooses a dividend
increase to distribute cash flows, we predict that the market will react positively as it
adjusts upward its expectation of cash flow permanence. This is a case where market
participants assigned too low a probability to the greater permanence, that is, Pr(p = 1 | g)
is too low. Figure 3 illustrates these predictions.
Thus, the permanence hypothesis predicts the following: (i) Conditional on a firm
choosing a dividend increase, thereby sending a strong signal about cash flow
permanence, the announcement return to the payout decision is predicted to be a
decreasing function of the cash flow permanence expected by the market, and (ii)
Conditional on a firm choosing a repurchase, thereby sending a weak signal about cash
flow permanence, the announcement return to the payout decision is predicted to be a
decreasing function of the cash flow permanence expected by the market.
Panels A and B of table 6 present announcement return regressions for dividend
increases and repurchases, respectively. In addition to our estimate of the market’s cash
flow permanence forecast (the adjusted return from table 5), the regressions include the
size of the distributions: percent of shares sought for repurchases and percent increase in
the dividend for dividend increases.

For the dividend specifications, we allow the

coefficient on the adjusted returns to vary across the two subgroups, substantial increases
and small/routine increases. Since a small, routine dividend increase is a weaker signal
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about cash flow permanence than a substantial increase, the coefficient on the adjusted
returns for this subgroup is predicted to be less negative than the coefficient for the
substantial increasers.
The results are consistent with the hypothesis that part of the information in the
payout announcement is the payout method, repurchase or dividend increase, and that
investors use this information to update their beliefs about the permanence of past and
current cash flow shocks. Specifically, in Panel A, the coefficient on the adjusted returns
for substantial dividend increasers is significantly negative, as predicted. This shows that
the announcement of a substantial dividend conveys positive information to the market
that is inversely proportional to how much permanence was attributed to the
contemporaneous cash flow shock. The magnitude of the coefficient for small/routine
dividend increasers is about 80% smaller, and not significantly different from zero,
supporting the notion that these dividend increases are not strong signals about cash flow
stability or permanence. The results in Panel B for repurchasing firms also support our
predictions. Consistent with repurchases being a signal about relatively transient cash
flow shocks, the association between announcement returns and adjusted returns is
negative and significant. The results in Panel B also indicate that this result is robust to
restricting the repurchaser sample to include only firms that also had a dividend program
in place.
To provide additional support for the permanence hypothesis, we also examine
the relations between announcement returns and positive and negative adjusted returns
separately. As described above, if the market expects a cash flow shock to be transitory,
(a negative return residual, and the firm announces a dividend increase, prices are
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predicted to react positively. However, if the market expects a cash flow shock to be
permanent (a positive return residual), and the firm announces a dividend increase, prices
are not predicted to react substantially since the market correctly assessed the
permanence of the cash flow shock prior to the distribution announcement. Thus, we
predict that, for substantial dividend increasers, the coefficient on negative adjusted
returns is negative and the coefficient on positive adjusted returns is less negative or zero.
Since small/routine dividend increases do not convey much information, splitting the
adjusted returns prior to these announcements into their positive and negative
components is not expected to increase the explanatory power of this variable. In the
repurchasing sample, if the market expects a cash flow shock to be transitory (a negative
return residual), and the firm announces a repurchase, prices are not predicted to react
substantially since prices already reflect the transitory nature of the cash flow shock.
However, if the market expects the cash flow shock to be permanent (a positive return
residual) and the firm announces a repurchase, prices should react negatively.

For

repurchasing firms, we predict that the coefficient on positive adjusted returns is negative
and the coefficient on negative adjusted returns is less negative or zero.
The results for the split positive and negative residual variables are broadly
consistent with the predictions. In the subsample of substantial dividend increasers, the
coefficient on negative adjusted returns is significantly negative, -0.29, whereas the
coefficient on positive adjusted returns is insignificantly positive. An F-test rejects the
hypothesis that these two coefficients are equal (not reported). In the full sample of
repurchasers, the split positive and negative residual coefficients are both negative and
nearly the same magnitude. However, when the repurchasing sample is restricted to
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include only those firms that have an established dividend, only the positive adjusted
returns have a significant negative association with announcement returns.

The

coefficient on negative adjusted returns is insignificantly positive. An F-test rejects the
hypothesis that the positive and negative adjusted return coefficients are equal (not
reported).
Our results are robust to the inclusion of variables determined by previous studies
to be related to the stock price reaction to dividend and repurchase announcements.
Specifically, we add total assets, market value-to-book value of assets, the leverage ratio,
and the ratio of cash to total assets to our original specification. Since larger firms are
expected to have less information asymmetry (e.g., Collins, Kothari and Rayburn, 1987,
and Brennan and Hughes, 1991), the surprise component of their distribution
announcement should be lower, leading to a smaller stock price reaction. Comment and
Jarrell (1991) also include a size variable in their repurchase announcement return
specifications. We use the market-to-book ratio to control for the finding that the stock
market reacts favorably to distributions of cash by firms with low growth opportunities
(see Lang and Litzenberger, 1989, and Nohel and Tarhan, 1998). Cash distributions to
shareholders increase leverage.

Jensen (1986) argues that agency theory predicts a

positive reaction to decisions that increase previously low leverage. Finally, we include
firms’ cash reserves to control for the agency theoretic prediction that the stock price
reaction to distributions by firms with large cash holdings will be positive (Barth and
Kaznik, 1997, and Lie, 1998). In most specifications, the coefficients on market-to-book
ratio and cash reserves are significant and in the predicted direction. Total assets and
leverage are insignificant in all of the regressions.
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Robustness Checks
We have noted throughout that the results are robust to the choices we have made
in each test. We discuss a further robustness check here.
To this point, our inferences implicitly assume that the partitioning of firms based
on payout choice is the primary driver of the observed differences in the permanence and
stability of the sample firms’ cash flows. However, the summary statistics in table 2
indicate that the repurchasing and dividend increasing samples differ somewhat with
respect to size, leverage, and the market-to-book ratio.

Several studies document

variation in the return-earnings relation as a function of firm size, growth, and risk (e.g.,
Collins and Kothari, 1987; Freeman, 1987). If the permanence and stability of cash flows
or their relation with stock prices vary systematically with these characteristics, our
inferences may be spurious.
To address this possibility, we allow the coefficient on cash flows in the Table 5
regressions to vary with size, leverage, and the market-to-book ratio. We construct
interaction variables for each of these variables in the same fashion as the dividend
increase interaction variables that are already included in the Table 5 regressions.
Although the coefficients on each of these additional interactive variables are significant,
neither the sign nor the significance of dividend interaction terms are affected. Further,
when the residuals from this augmented model are used in the announcement return
regressions, the results are unchanged.
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5. CONCLUDING DISCUSSION
We hypothesize that the method used to distribute cash flows reflects the nature
of the underlying cash flow process. The hypothesis has two parts. First, firms use
repurchases to distribute cash flow shocks that are primarily transient, and use dividends
for cash flow shocks containing a larger permanent component. Second, the market
recognizes this association and uses the announcement of a particular distribution method
to update its belief about the permanence of past and contemporary cash flow shocks.
Our tests show that cash flow shocks followed by substantial dividend increases
have a larger permanent component than those followed by either repurchases or
small/routine dividend increases. This means that the cash flows of substantial dividendincreasing firms are less likely to revert back to levels prior to the cash flow shock, and,
hence, are more stable. Thus, the permanence of contemporaneous cash flow shocks is
strongly related to the type of payout method chosen. Our announcement return analysis
demonstrates that an important component to the information released by a distribution
announcement is the method used to distribute the cash flows. We find strong evidence
that when the payout method does not match the market’s expectations, the market
updates its previous assessment of the permanence of the cash flow shock.

These

findings indicate that the distribution method used by managers signals information about
the permanence of the cash flow shock.
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TABLE 1: TEMPORAL DISTRIBUTION OF THE SAMPLES
This table presents the temporal distribution (1981-1993) of the firms increasing dividends or initiating an
open-market repurchase that enter our sample. The repurchases come from all open-market repurchase
announcements recorded in the SDC database. We eliminate all repurchases that are preceded by another
one in the prior 4 quarters. These repurchases could be reauthorizations of the previously announced
program. We use the CRSP database to identify all firms increasing their dividends over the sample period.
In our study, a dividend increase is defined to occur when the current year’s total dividend payout is greater
than the previous year’s dividend payout. Annual dividend increases are included only when each quarterly
dividend change within a fiscal year is either positive or zero; that is, when both negative and positive
quarterly changes occur within the same fiscal period, the observation is excluded.

1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
Total

Repurchases
15
12
37
143
49
64
161
59
160
165
69
110
109
1153

Dividend Increases
446
296
291
406
388
367
401
478
469
416
357
378
317
5010

TABLE 2: SUMMARY STATISTICS
Summary statistics on general characteristics of the sample firms are presented along with tests for differences between the
subsamples. Repurchasers are compared to the two groups of dividend increasers: small/routine increases and substantial
increases. A firm that has not had a dividend increase in the prior year or whose increase is larger than that from the previous
year is included in the substantial increases group. All financial characteristics are computed at the end of the fiscal year prior
to the payout change. The market value of equity is computed as the ending share price multiplied by the number of shares
outstanding. Market-to-book (assets) is computed as (book assets – book equity + market value of equity) / book assets. The
leverage ratio, book liabilities / market value of equity, is computed by subtracting book equity from book assets and dividing
that figure by the market value of equity. The percentage increase in the dividend is calculated by scaling the dollar change in
the dividend by the most recently issued quarterly dividend prior to the change. Percentage of shares sought is based on
statements made by the company as recorded by SDC. Cumulative abnormal returns for the announcement period are
computed based on market model regressions for days –252 to –20 relative to the announcement. Tests for difference for the
means are t-tests and the t-statistics are presented. Tests for difference for the medians are signed-rank tests and the Z-statistics
are presented.
Repurchasers

Substantial
Dividend
Increasers

Test for Diff.
with
Repurchasers

Small/
Routine
Divd Incr.

Test for Diff.
with
Repurchasers

Market Value of Equity

Mean
Median

1996.28
439.04

1923.10
439.90

0.45
-0.47

2167.60
655.50

-0.85
-5.58***

Book Assets

Mean
Median

2127.44
419.87

2275.54
495.52

-0.69
-2.57***

2233.96
622.42

-0.50
-5.72***

Market-to-Book (Assets)

Mean
Median

1.62
1.33

1.54
1.28

2.73***
2.61***

1.66
1.39

-1.26
-3.56***

Book Liabilities/ MV Equity

Mean
Median

0.76
0.52

0.94
0.64

-5.61***
-6.09***

0.80
0.56

-1.34
-2.26**

% Increase in Dividend

Mean
Median

% Shares Soughta

Mean
Median

8.59
6.30

Announcement CAR (%)

Mean
Median

2.30
1.92

1.19
0.88

1153

2962

Number of Observations
a

30.88
13.16

The number of observations with data available for shares sought is 676.
and ** indicate significance at the 1 and 5% levels, respectively.

***

13.25
8.62

3.87***
4.34***

0.26
0.17
2048

7.06***
8.24***

TABLE 3: CASH FLOW SHOCKS AND PERMANENCE
Means and medians of the cash flow shock, permanence of the shock, and stability of the shock are presented.1
The table also contains test statistics for the hypothesis that the means and medians are not different between the
repurchasing sample and the dividend increasing samples. Dividend increases are subdivided into two groups:
small/routine increases and substantial increases. A firm that has not had a dividend increase in the prior year or
whose increase is larger than that from the previous year is included in the substantial increases group.

Firms

Cash Flow Shock

Permanence

Stability

Repurchasing
N=1153

Mean
Median

0.320***
0.040***

-0.006
-0.069***

0.070***
-0.073**

Substantial Dividend Increases
N=2962

Mean
Median

0.247***
0.064***

0.014
-0.049***

0.109***
0.017***

0.819
2.221**

1.292
4.559***

0.098***
-0.005

0.020
-0.048***

-0.006
-0.071***

t-test for equality of means with Reps
Z-test for equality of medians with Reps

-5.821***
-3.305***

1.008
2.442**

-2.593***
0.165

t-test for Small vs. Substantial Divd. Incr.
Z-test for Small vs. Substantial Divd. Incr.

-6.913***
-7.397***

0.331
0.306

-6.531***
-6.678***

-1.854*
1.835*

t-test for equality of means with Reps
Z-test for equality of medians with Reps

Small/Routine Dividend Increases
N=2048

***

1

Mean
Median

, **, * indicate that the number is significantly different from zero at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.

Cash flow shock is defined as:

Avg Cash Flow in years -1 and 0 - Avg Cash flow in years - 4 to - 2
Avg Cash flow in years - 4 to - 2

Permanence is defined as:

Avg Cash flow in years + 1 to + 3 - Avg Cash flow in years - 1 and 0
Avg Cash flow in years - 1 and 0

Stability is defined as:

Avg Cash flow in years + 1 to + 3 - Avg Cash flow in years - 4 to - 2
Avg Cash flow in years - 4 to - 2

TABLE 4: COMPARISON OF PERMANENCE AND STABILITY TO NON-SAMPLE FIRMS
Sample repurchasing and dividend increasing firms are matched with firms that have not changed their payout policy. The control sample is generated by
creating 20 portfolios of cash flow shocks and matching each sample firm to a portfolio with a similar-sized cash flow shock. Each control portfolio is then
restricted to contain only firms with the same 2-digit SIC code as the sample firm. The permanence and stability (as defined above in the footnotes to table 3) are
computed for the entire sample, the repurchasing subsample, the dividend increasing subsamples, and the matching firms for each sample. The mean and median
difference between the sample firms and the matching firms are also reported for each case.

Permanence
Sample
Firms

***

Matching
Firms

Stability
Difference

Sample
Firms

Matching
Firms

Difference

0.030***
0.012***

0.062***
-0.033**

0.039***
-0.063***

0.023***
0.012***

0.062**
-0.074**

0.088***
-0.064*

All firms

Mean
Median

0.013
-0.051***

-0.017***
-0.083***

Repurchasers

Mean
Median

-0.006
-0.068***

0.015
-0.108***

Substantial Divd
Increases

Mean
Median

0.015
-0.046***

-0.038***
-0.086***

0.053***
0.032***

Small/Routine Divd
Increases

Mean
Median

0.019
-0.048***

-0.006
-0.050***

0.025*
0.003

-0.021
-0.019

0.108***
0.017***

0.061***
-0.054

-0.005
-0.070***

-0.020**
-0.086***

-0.025
-0.016
0.047***
0.030***
0.015
-0.001

, **, * indicate that the number is significantly different from zero at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.

The sample sizes are slightly smaller than in table 3 because adequate matching firms could not be identified. Repurchasers – 1,116 firms, Substantial dividend
increasers – 2,878 firms, and Small/routine dividend increasers – 2,011 firms.

TABLE 5: STOCK PRICE RESPONSE TO CASH FLOWS
The dependent variable in all of the regressions is the stock-price return for the 2 years prior to the quarter in which
the payout was announced. 2-year cash flows are cash flows measured contemporaneously with the stock-price
return. “Substantial Dividend dummy interacted with CF” is equal to the 2-year cash flows for substantial dividend
increasers, and 0 for small/routine dividend increasers and repurchasers. “Small/routine Dividend dummy interacted
with CF” is equal to 2-year cash flows for the 2048 dividend increases identified in the Data section as small and
routine, and 0 for substantial dividend increasers and repurchasers. The restricted sample includes all dividend
firms, but excludes repurchasing firms that did not have a dividend program in place. The sample includes 1153
repurchasers, 2962 substantial dividend increasers and 2048 small/routine dividend increasers.

Dependent Variable is 2-year Stock Returns

Intercept

0.212**
(2.197)

Substantial Dividend dummy
Interacted with CF

0.351***
(4.634)

0.479***
(5.622)

Small/Routine Dividend dummy
interacted with CF

0.103
(1.293)

0.231***
(2.623)

Adj R2

0.580***
(8.535)

Restricted
(3)
0.059***
(3.158)

0.397***
(4.616)

2-year Cash flows

***

Full Sample
(1)
(2)
0.042**
0.039**
(2.248)
(2.106)

0.018

0.024

and ** indicate significance at the 1 and 5% levels, respectively.
t-statistics are in parentheses

0.025

TABLE 6: ANNOUNCEMENT RETURNS
This table presents announcement return regressions for dividend changes in Panel A and repurchases in
Panel B. The announcement period is day –5 to day +5 relative to the dividend declaration date or the
repurchase program announcement date. Cumulative abnormal returns are computed based on market
model regressions for days –252 to –20. The residual from specification (2) in table 5 is the “Table 5
Adjusted Return,” which is the adjusted return from the period contemporaneous with the cash flows. The
adjusted return from Table 5 is positively related to the likelihood the market places on the announcement of
a dividend increase as the method of payout. This return is also interacted with indicator variables for each
of the dividend subsamples. Finally, because the predictions of the permanence hypothesis are strongest for
dividend increasers with negative adjusted returns from table 5 and for repurchasers with positive adjusted
returns from table 5, the adjusted return variables are split into their positive and negative components.
The repurchase regressions are estimated for two samples: (1) the full sample of all firms having repurchases
between 1981 and 1993, and (2) the restricted sample of only repurchasing firms that also had a dividend
program in place. Cash / Total Assets is the ratio of cash and short term investments (Compustat item 1) to
total assets at the beginning of the fiscal year containing the distribution announcement. Percent Dividend
Change, Percent of Shares Sought, Total Assets, M/B of Assets and Leverage Ratio are defined in the notes
to Table 2.

Panel A: Dividend Increasers
Regressor

Pred.
Sign

Intercept

Coefficient
0.007***
(7.213)

0.012***
(4.203)

Percent Dividend Change

+

0.000
(0.467)

0.000
(0.368)

Table 5 Adj. Return interacted with
Substantial Dividend Dummy

-

-0.010***
(-4.186)

-0.008***
(-3.379)

0.010***
(3.260)
-0.000
(-0.005)

Only positive adj. Returns2

-/0

0.001
(0.291)

Only negative adj. Returns2

-

-0.029***
(-5.320)

Table 5 Adj. Return interacted with
Small/Routine Dividend Dummy

-/0 1

Only positive adj. returns

-/0 1

-0.000
(-0.083)

Only negative adj. returns

-/0 1

0.000
(0.049)

-0.002
(-0.726)

-0.000
(-0.046)

Total Assets

-

-0.000
(-0.513)

-0.000
(-0.356)

Market-to-Book of Assets

-

-0.005***
(-4.207)

-0.005***
(-4.239)

Leverage Ratio

-

0.002
(1.364)

0.001
(1.143)

Cash / Total Assets

+

0.020**
(2.356)

0.017**
(1.986)

Adj. R2
Number of Observations

0.005
3158

0.013
3158

0.019
3158

t-statistics are in parentheses
1
While the predictions for the Small/routine Dividend Increasers are in the same direction as for the
Substantial Dividend Increasers, a small/routine increase is expected to send a significantly weaker
signal about cash flow permanence than a substantial increase. Thus, while we test the significance of
these coefficients against a null hypothesis of zero above, we also perform F-tests to confirm that the
coefficients for the two subgroups are statistically different from each other.
2
An F-test rejects the hypothesis that the coefficients on only positive adj. returns and only negative
adj. returns are equal for substantial dividend increasers.

Panel B: Repurchasers
Pred.
Sign
Intercept

Full Sample

Restricted Sample

0.007***
(1.280)

0.029**
(2.540)

0.029**
(2.340)

0.027**
(2.170)

0.033**
(2.516)

0.000
(0.835)

0.000
(0.535)

0.000
(0.561)

Percent of Shares Sought

+

0.001
(1.542)

0.000
(0.837)

Adj. Return from Table 5

-

-0.018***
(-2.677)

-0.014**
(-2.144)

-0.018**
(-2.250)

Only positive adj. returns1

-

-0.014
(-1.444)

-0.033**
(-2.495)

Only negative adj. returns1

-/0

-0.013
(-0.787)

0.006
(0.320)

Total Assets

-

0.000
(0.792)

0.000
(0.773)

0.000
(0.839)

0.000
(0.603)

Market-to-Book of Assets

-

-0.019***
(-4.107)

-0.019***
(-4.101)

-0.013**
(-2.407)

-0.012**
(-2.377)

Leverage Ratio

-

-0.000
(-0.071)

-0.000
(-0.069)

0.001
(0.112)

0.001
(0.114)

Cash / Total Assets

+

-0.003
(-0.099)

-0.001
(-0.023)

Adj. R2
Number of Observations

0.106***
(3.763)
0.017
468

0.059
468

0.107***
(3.741)
0.057
468

0.038
310

***

and ** indicate significance at the 1 and 5% levels, respectively.
t-statistics are in parentheses
1

An F-test rejects the hypothesis that the only positive adj. returns and only negative adj. returns
coefficients are equal in the regression estimated on the restricted sample.

0.041
310

Figure 1: Cash flow Time Series
Permanence

Stability

Pre-shock Cash flows
Years-4, -3 and -2

Shock Cash flows
Years –1 and 0

Post shock Cash flows
Years +1, +2, +3

The Cash flow Shock is (Shock Cash flows – Pre-shock Cash flows) / Pre-Shock Cash flows
Permanence is (Post-shock cash flows – Shock Cash flows) / Shock Cash flows
Stability is (Post-shock cash flows – Pre-shock cash flows) / Pre-shock cash flows

Figure 2: Regression Tests Timeline
CF Response Coefficient Measurement Period
(corresponds to cash flow shock
period
from above)
Q -4

Q -8

Q0

Market makes its assessment of
permanence of cash flows and residual
from table 5 is measured

Payout Method
is Announced

Q +1

When announcement is made,
market uses payout method to
update its assessment of cash flow
permanence

FIGURE 3
This figure illustrates the predictions of the permanence hypothesis for the updating done
by the market at the time of the payout method announcement. In both cases, (i) a
dividend increase is announced when a repurchase was expected, or (ii) a repurchase is
announced when a dividend increase was expected, the residual from table 5 and the
announcement return are negatively associated.

(i) Dividend Increase is announced when a repurchase was expected.
Predicted return for a similar firm
that subsequently announces an
expected dividend.

Residual is negative and
announcement reaction
is positive

Time
Actual return for firm that surprises the
market by announcing a dividend, signaling
higher permanence of cash flows.

Dividend is
Announced

(ii) Repurchase is announced when a dividend increase was expected.
Actual return for firm that surprises the
market by announcing a repurchase, signaling
lower permanence of cash flows.
Residual is positive and
announcement reaction
is negative

Time

Predicted return for a similar firm that
subsequently announces an expected
repurchase.

